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“What’s the point of an island”
Eric Loret
Translation : Phoebe Clarke
EDITOR'S NOTE
Texte original d’Eric Loret paru en français sous le titre « Une île pour quoi faire » dans 
Petit manuel critique, Paris : Les Prairies ordinaires, 2015, p. 7-11 et 20-22, (Essais)
© Les Prairies ordinaires, 2015, with the courtesy of the author
Même si « écrire de la critique est, sauf sous forme d’essai, une activité périmée » (Petit
manuel critique, p. 182), Eric Loret cultive la grande ambition de la modestie de la critique,
pour peu qu’elle sache « ne pas servir et connaître la liberté de l’inutile ». En
revendiquant son inscription dans la sphère de la « publicité » kantienne, elle interroge et
nourrit les représentations collectives. Plutôt qu’à prétendre fourbir un jugement
quantifié, la critique n’envisage le jugement qu’assorti de sursis. Portée par une écriture
déterminée et une énergie dialectique stimulante, la position critique volontaire telle
qu’elle se précise au fil des pages du Petit manuel critique, dont nous avons ici choisi de
traduire vers l’anglais un extrait, ne démérite pas de son titre, sous son air bonhomme de
« manuel ». On attendra une suite qui saurait reconnaître les formes et modes d’existence
d’une telle critique, non normative, non prescriptive, et qui saurait, comme ces pages
savent le tenter, entretenir une position d’énonciation claire qui vise, plutôt que le
jugement, le partage d’une attention esthétique exigeante, nourrie, sans craindre
contradiction et débat.
Christophe Domino
/
Original text by Eric Loret, published in French as « Une île pour quoi faire » in Petit
manuel critique, Paris : Les Prairies ordinaires, 2015, p. 7-11 and 20-22, (Essais)
© Les Prairies ordinaires, 2015, with permission from the author
Even though “writing criticism, except as an essay, is an out-of-date endeavour” (Petit
manuel critique, p. 182), Eric Loret aspires to a modest sort of criticism that understands
“how not to serve, and recognises the freedom of uselessness”. By claiming its affiliation
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to the Kantian sphere of “publicity”, it questions and develops collective representation.
Rather than pretending to hone in on a quantified judgement, criticism merely considers
judgement as a suspended sentence. Shored up by a resolute style and stimulating
dialectical energy, the strong-minded critical position expounded in the Petit manuel
critique proves worthy of its title, despite the ingenuous evocation of a handbook through
the use of the term “manuel”. We await further developments that take into account the
forms and modes of existence of this type of non-normative, non-prescriptive criticism
which, as this excerpt attempts to show, entertain a clear position of enunciation aimed
at sharing a demanding and sustained aesthetic attention rather than judgement, without
fear of contradiction and debate.
Christophe Domino
1 People often ask: “What book (or film, or record, etc.) would you take to a desert island?”
The most sensible answer is: “None.” Provided, of course, that we agree on what deserted
means  here.  To  wit:  an  inaccessible  place  where  one  is  indeed  alone,  and,  most
importantly, where one is sure never to see a human being again in one’s life. Otherwise
it’s just a walk in the park, a slightly protracted wait.
2 If one wanted to be clearer, one could say: “What book (or film, or record, etc.) would you
like to find after having been shipwrecked, alone, on a desert island?” Because bringing
along a book (etc.) implies that the Robinson Crusoe game will not last. If I am sure that
people will come and save me, I can read while awaiting my rescue, and if I am not sure, I
can pretend:  pretend I  am not alone,  pretend I  will be saved,  deny that I  have been
abandoned. But if I should indeed stay alone on the island forever, reading a book or
contemplating a painting would become meaningless activities, because the pleasure they
could give me would never be shared with another human being again. In fact, apart from
purely physiological survival,  wouldn’t any activity become meaningless,  inasmuch as
meaning is a construct devised by the many, and in this case one would have no Other to
relate to? And there would be no pleasure either,  since intellectual  pleasure consists
precisely in the creation of meaning. In order to continue existing as a human being, the
eighteenth-century  castaway  Robinson  Crusoe  had  to  invent  an  imaginary  friend,
domesticate an animal, or go insane.
3 The second problem this  question poses  lies  in  the singleness  of  this  artwork,  be  it
discovered or taken along to begin with. One is asked to establish a hierarchy, to decide
which artwork is the best,  the absolute, the one that requires nothing but this silent
island. This comes as no surprise, as many people love to judge artworks and establish
scales of satisfaction. But, from a logical viewpoint, the first element in a ranking cannot
exist without the rest of the list, which makes simultaneously being the first and the only
item on the list rather difficult. Besides, imagining that just one artwork could suffice for
a whole lifetime is related to the mistake of believing that one could enjoy it absolutely,
with no Other in sight. This also means that reading or listening to the same work again
and again could only echo what we remember of previous hearings or readings, without
ever  interacting  with  new  ideas;  and  that  the  pleasure  derived  could  never  be
transformed or renewed. An adulterated version of Kant’s description of the “sublime” as
“absolutely great” and “great beyond comparison” can be identified in this question1.
This is where our denatured ideas of masterpiece and genius come from.
4 Indeed, the third difficulty lies in the fact that the book that is supposed to fulfil me (if
such a thing is possible) may suit me but no one else. It is wrong to believe that certain
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absolute artworks are unanimously admired, as if, like a mystical revelation, one could
not escape their greatness. Therefore, asking what my favourite book is can tell you a lot
about my personality and taste, but will be useless as a guide to finding your way through
literature. The most pitiful question one can ask a professional critic is, “What good books
or shows are there at the moment?” - except, of course, if the critic and her interlocutor
have the same taste (that for which there is “no accounting”), or if the question concerns
a group exhibition, in which case there will be something for everyone.
5 The matter of artworks and desert islands, like all false issues, is an invitation to reflect
upon the real use we make of art. The activity of enjoying a piece of art can apparently
hardly exist without being shared. Sharing can consist of a remark, a smile, a few words, a
gesture or a long palaver2. Critical discourse is one way of sharing — but it isn’t the only
way. Nowadays, criticism is something like an episode from Robinson Crusoe rather than
a way of sharing: a vox clamantis in deserto with nothing much to say, because for such a
long time it has not been addressed to anyone in particular. As far as institutional and
professional criticism is concerned, most magazines devoted to art, cinema and literature
have seen a sharp decline in their readership, although (with the exception of cinema)
their former readers have not shifted to the Internet. Critical discourse appearing in the
“old media”, which is now perceived as institutional, is subsumed within a more general
political distrust and is vilified as such; sometimes rightly, because of favours granted
among critics and conflicts of interest among the media, publishing and the film industry.
6 By the same token, this disaffection with classical criticism corresponds to an upsurge in
“domestic”  criticism  in  blogs,  forums  and  on  social  media,  which  often  mimes  the
mannerisms  of  traditional  criticism  and  reproduces  its  worst  flaws,  dealing  out
disapproval and praise on the sole criterion of personal taste. Because social networks
paradoxically seem to encourage speaking out rather than listening, exchanges that hope
to address and welcome all comers barely exist. Though it is free of any kind of authority
and accessible to all, this new kind of criticism is not necessarily successful: even when it
does overcome its egotistical tendencies and its confrontational relationship with the old
media, it almost only expresses itself on the outskirts of legitimacy, as comments and
answers to “authorised” texts, for instance. But when online criticism does reach as wide
an audience as a journal3,  it must face its readers’ and viewers’ hatred, much like its
traditional counterpart. At this stage, it generally becomes wary of questions concerning
taste and starts looking for “objective” judgment criteria. Since this type of criticism does
not know what value it  should attach to taste and emotions as such,  it  tries to give
quantifiable justification to the pleasure or displeasure it feels. Artworks are judged not
according to what they are, but according to what they should be, to their ability to
adhere to the requirements of a recipe. Robinson Crusoe thus becomes a productivist
critic since, as Marx observed, he keeps a detailed inventory “of the objects of utility that
belong to him, of the operations necessary for their production; and lastly, of the labour
time that definite quantities of those objects have, on an average, cost him.”4
7 What can be salvaged, despite its faults, from the traditional methods of criticism in order
to construct a new kind of criticism created by everyone and able to generate processes of
legitimisation that would ensure its sharing? The idea of a “critique of taste” is an old
one, even more so than the island question first raised by Kant. Determining a rule to
discuss that which cannot be discussed is indeed a political necessity. But it is above all an
apparently impossible task: as Bourdieu demonstrated, taste is socially and politically
determined, and it is only possible to say which taste we want depending on the politics
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we want, not which politics would ensue from a nonexistent “natural” taste. However,
the claim that taste is wholly cultural upsets what individual experience teaches us: the
awe and  jubilation  we  feel  before  what  we  call  “beauty”  seems  to  be  shared  by  all
humankind, even if it does not always apply to the same objects. So it is tempting to state
that a universal  does exist,  not of a “taste for something”,  but of taste tout  court. For
instance, though the food in such and such a part of the world may seem vile to me, I can
clearly see that culinary pleasure is common to everyone, all over the world, although
admittedly to different degrees, depending on class, culture, etc. Experience also suggests
that I can enjoy Schumann and Taylor Swift in the same way, and that they can also be
enjoyed in different ways.
8 The idea is therefore this one: on the one hand, to try and understand, to the quick, what
the pleasures we take from art are (which would obviously include knowing what the
term “art” means, even if we can sense that the definition might be somewhat circular,
because art would be defined by a certain type of pleasure). One would then establish
“critical principles” that would allow everyone to speak of experienced pleasure in the
clearest and most methodical way possible. On the other hand, one would define the type
of desired social cohesion and the relevant representations on which it would be founded,
because  sharing  is  obviously  not  only  speaking  and  being  heard,  nor  is  it  listening
proportionally to how much we wish to be heard: it is also means distributing tasks to
achieve a project. Criticism by everyone and with everyone, therefore, with a view to a
single oeuvre: the world.
9 […]
10 However, as noted above, at a time when the new media allow everyone to play God and
decide  what  is  good  and  what  is  not,  the  kind  of  criticism  directed  towards  the
distribution and discussion of taste is no longer topical. Although the war of all against all
is a reality, it cannot claim to be a political project. Instead, one should search for what
Jacques Rancière has long referred to as the “distribution of the sensible” that strives
toward an “aesthetic republic”. This process is described in Le Fil  Perdu,  among other
works. Although Rancière does not imply that his advice can be applied to a critique of
taste, it does seem to pave the way for it: “The main thing is to set out, to act like a
researcher, carefully watching for any symbol traced by another hand, for any nearby
speech, and, as an artist, to try and arrange the signs that are able to speak to another
mind.”5
11 What we aim for is a democracy of equal intelligences, an “unprecedented community of
individuals hazarding ways of reaching each other through the forest of symbols and
shapes, a community made up of multiple journeys and encounters, under the sign of
equality”6, as Rancière puts it. Of course, “any symbol traced by another hand” and “any
nearby speech”, attempt to displace criticism from the framework of legitimate objects
and masterpieces alone, but also guards them against mass-produced cultural goods that
no “hand” designed, at least no hand that “hazards” to “reach” the hands of others. This
should not prevent us from examining the pleasure and use we all find in these kinds of
objects.  Furthermore,  “arranging  the  signs  that  are  able  to  speak  to  another  mind”
implies being an artistic spectator and inviting the person we ask to “come and look” to
converse and disagree with us. In the case of ordinary, media, and academic criticism,
this means knowing how to leave one’s discourse open, hinged on the question William
James asked as a pragmatic solution to any philosophical question: “In what respects
would the world be different if this alternative or that were true?”7
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NOTES
1.  Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment,  translated by J.H. Bernard,  London: Macmillian, 1914,
“Analytic of the Sublime”, §25, p. 86
2. A  note  by  Wittgenstein  on  the  comprehension  or  the  explanation  of  a  musical  phrase:
“Sometimes the simplest explanation is a gesture; on another occasion it might be a dance step,
or  words  describing  a  dance.”  (Culture  and  Value,  translated  by  Peter  Winch,  Oxford:  Basil
Blackwell, 1980, p. 69e)
3.  For  example  Durendal1’s  Youtube channel,  affiliated to  www.cinephile.info,  offers  several
different programmes (The Cinema of Durendal, Why I’m Right and You’re Wrong, Retrospective...) and
has 80,000 followers.
4.  Marx, Karl. Capital, Book I, Section 1, chapter 1, IV, on: https://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4, p. 50
5.  Rancière, Jacques. Le Fil perdu, Paris : La Fabrique, 2014, p.88. (Not yet published in English)
6. Ibid., p. 93
7.  James, William. Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Longman : Green & co,
1907, p. 48
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